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Listokin has recently drawn our attention to the fact that virtually nothing is known 
about the magnitude of prisoners’ discount rates in relation to their foregone income 
(legal or illegal), which incarceration implies. He argues that since prisoners are likely 
to exhibit high discount rates, pre  sentence delays will impose higher costs on 
offenders not on bail compared with those who are granted bail by the court. Utilising 
actual plea choices made by a sample of not on bail prisoners for three different 
offences in NSW, this study derives convincing estimates of prisoners’ rates of time 
preference. Prisoners do discount future returns and at high rates, as predicted by 
criminologists and other scholars, who have addressed this issue theoretically. The 
modelling technique utilised in this paper (dynamic present value) captures the 
stochastic movement of the prisoner’s probability of conviction during the delay 
period. This is a considerable methodological improvement over the standard static 
















1.  Introduction 
 
Much has been written by criminologists, sociologists, lawyers, economists and other 
commentators about the causes of individual criminal behaviour. An example is the 
work of Nagin and Paternoster (1993, 1994), who bring together and attempt to 
reconcile, apparently two contradictory strands of thought on this issue as follows.  
According to criminologists, either personal enduring individual characteristics 
(present orientation and self centeredness, which are stable over time), or rational 
choices, (opportunities to offend are taken advantage of if expected benefits exceed 
expected costs), explain individual dispositions towards criminal behaviour. However, 
Nagin and Paternoster contend that contrary to the opinion of some scholars, the two 
theories are not incompatible. The common thread that links them is: (a) little weight 
placed by the individual on the consequences of actions, or their impact on others and 
(b) poor individual self control. As a consequence of this combination of personal 
attributes, some people cannot commit to the future and invest very little in it. 
Consequently, their energies tend to be predominantly channelled into a combination 
of illegal and legal, but unconventional and sometimes harmful activities, such as 
excessive alcohol consumption.  
In both of their studies, Nagin and Paternoster have empirically tested their theoretical 
reconciliation of these hypotheses using potential rather than actual offenders drawn 
from a sample of students, from a large public university. The objective was to 4 
 
include a large proportion of potential marginal offenders, defined as those who do 
not have a strong disposition toward committing or not committing a crime. In their 
1992 work, scenarios were presented to the sampled students for three different 
offences: drinking and driving, theft and sexual assault, and models were estimated on 
the basis of these using Tobit regressions. The dependent variable was the 
respondent’s estimate that they would commit the same offence as the scenario 
character (0 to 100%). The independent variables were: (a) lack of self control 
(impulsiveness, desire for simple tasks, risk preference, preference for physical 
activity, self-centredness and temper); (b) an index of criminal opportunities and 
situational factors; (c) perceived utility (costs and benefits) by asking respondents, for 
example, to estimate the probability of prison if caught; (d) a measure of shame, 
which is an internally imposed sanction and (e) gender and prior offending. The 
authors found: (a) lack of self control had a strong positive association with intention 
to offend, because rewards from crime were perceived as being more valuable, and 
the costs as imposing very low disutility. Furthermore, low self control was correlated 
with low levels of shame from committing the offence, and (b) poor self control was 
related to prior offending behaviour. It was found that a one standard deviation 
increase in total sanctions (shame) reduced intention to offend by 17% (18%), 22% 
(18%) and 40% (20%) for theft, drinking and driving and sexual assault respectively. 
Conversely a one standard deviation increase in perceived pleasure (reduction in self 
control) increased intentions by 67% (39%), 23% (17%) and 55% (83%). It was 
concluded that: “…independent of lack of self control conventionally postulated 
mechanisms of social control are operating.” 5 
 
The authors’ 1994 work extends this analysis by introducing the notion of individual 
personal capital. They examined theoretically and empirically the relationship 
between deterrence, perceived risk of damaged personal capital, and an individual’s 
present orientation and self-centeredness. Personal capital consists of investments in 
commitments (conventional things such as education and developing one’s human 
capital) and in stable satisfying social relationships or attachments to friends and 
family. These investments necessitate trading off future against present gratification, 
and consequently reveal a rate of time preference or personal discount rate. 
Individuals with high discount rates will make little investment in personal capital 
compared to those with much lower discount rates. The former, will be a lot more self 
centred and less deterred by internally and externally imposed sanctions, than the 
latter. 
 Each respondent was presented with three scenarios pertaining to three different 
offences: drunken driving, larceny and sexual assault. Broad support was found for 
the authors’ extension of their model. First, highly present oriented and self centred 
individuals place a low value on accumulating personal capital, since they believe that 
they have very little to lose from not investing in it. Second, intentions to commit each 
offence are an increasing function of the person’s lack of self control and perception 
of the psychic benefit from its commission, and a decreasing function of the perceived 
immorality of offending. Third, the perceived risk of exposure and therefore 
deterrence varies inversely with present orientation and self centeredness in the case 
of larceny and sexual assault, but not drunk driving.  6 
 
These very useful studies suggest that high personal discount rates acquired early in 
life are correlated with an increased propensity to offend.  High personal discount rate 
persons, who do eventually commit a crime and are caught, successfully prosecuted, 
and then imprisoned, are the subject of recent discussion and analysis by Listokin 
(2007). He argues convincingly, that the real value of a prison sentence imposed on 
convicted offenders is not independent of their pre trial bail status, where real refers to 
the discounted value of a fine or imprisonment at the time the crime was committed. 
For example, since offenders allegedly discount incarceration because it is unpleasant 
and consequently yields disutility, a prison sentence of three years imposed on a 
defendant not granted bail, is not equivalent in terms of units of disutility to three 
years imposed on a defendant, who is on bail. This is the case even when sentence 
backdating is taken into account in the case of the defendant who is incarcerated after 
being charged. If offenders discount the future, then pre sentence delays impose a 
higher cost on not on bail defendants. 
Listokin’s analysis like the work of Nagin and Paternoster probes a number of 
important matters: (a) Do criminals discount the future? (b) What is the connection if 
any between discounting and lags in prison sentences, i.e. are prison sentences 
imposed with a lag less severe than a more immediate ‘equivalent’? (c) How 
important is the uncertainty of a prison sentence to offenders, and what is the trade off 
between uncertainty and discounting and (d) Are offenders’ discount rates 
exceptionally high?  
 7 
 
Quantitative estimates of imprisoned offenders’ discount rates are virtually absent 
from the literature, however much has been written about offenders’ characteristics 
and personalities, which is consistent with the picture of high discount rate 
individuals, (present orientation, low self control, self-centeredness and low 
investment in personal capital), painted by Nagin and Paternoster. For example, Giles 
and Le (2007) citing Moore (1996) have described how before incarceration, 
prisoners tended to be economically disadvantaged, not to have permanent or long 
term accommodation and to have high rates of drug abuse and poor labour market 
prospects. 
In a previous piece published in the Flinders Journal of Law Reform, a methodology 
was described, which enabled defendant discount rates to be calibrated, from their 
observed plea decisions (Torre, 2007-08). A non technical discussion of time 
preference, discount rates and the theoretical and empirical methodology utilised in 
this paper can be found therein. Attempts were made in Torre and Wraith (2008) to 
quantify discount rates for three offences, murder, burglary and aggravated robbery in 
NSW, Australia, for offenders who were not granted bail, and the estimates provide 
further support for the Nagin and Paternoster synthesis of the relevant criminology 
literature. Furthermore, unlike Nagin and Paternoster, the discount rates are inferred 
from actual offender decisions rather than from hypothetical questions being put to 






Table 1: Estimates of Offenders’ Discount Rates. NSW. 2004. 
P*                                 0.3                                       0.5                                             0.8 
Murder                      0.33                                      0.28                                           0.17 
A/Robbery                0.50                                      0.44                                           0.38 
Burglary                    0.58                                      0.50                                           0.36    
P* is the offender’s probability of conviction following a trial. 
The interpretation of the data in table 1 is as follows. Each of the discount rates can be 
thought of as dividing the distribution of offenders who were prosecuted for the crime 
into those who pleaded guilty and those who went to trial. Since the costs or expected 
costs of punishment (jail sentence) are measured in terms of foregone income, the 
discount rate is to be interpreted in the conventional way. It measures the offender’s 
trade off between present and future income and is a potential indicator of the 
psychological attributes documented by Nagin and Paternoster and Listokin.  Low 
discount rates are indicative of a low propensity to offend and conversely for high 
discount rates, holding everything else constant. Estimates were obtained for three 
different conviction probabilities. In the case of murder, those defendants who 
pleaded guilty (15) are estimated to have had discount rates  ≤ 0.33, 0.28 and 0.17 
respectively and those who went to trial (69)  ≥ 0.33, 0.28 and 0.17 respectively. The 
three estimates correspond to the different probabilities of conviction. Of the 113 9 
 
offenders, who pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery, their discount rates were  ≤ 0.50, 
0.44 and 0.38, while the 202 offenders who went to trial had discount rates  ≥ 0.50, 
0.44 and 0.38. Finally 163 offenders pleaded guilty to burglary, and their discount 
rates were ≤ 0.58, 0.50 and 0.36, and 282 went to trial and exhibited discount rates ≥ 
0.58, 0.50 and 0.36. 
Economic theory or the criminology literature provides little guidance as to the cut off 
point between low and high discount rates, nevertheless all of the defendants who 
went to trial could without too much trouble be characterised as being in the latter 
category. It is not the purpose of this study to explain the differences across the 
offences, nor can this be done, given the methodology adopted. However, better 
estimates than those in table 1 can be obtained because these values assume 
unrealistically that the offender’s probability of conviction is fixed at the time of 
being remanded in custody and remains the same until the case is concluded.  
The basis for the table 1 computations is the standard static present value (PV) model 
used extensively in finance, i.e. a dollar received now does not have the same value as 
a dollar to be received twelve months subsequently, which is why people demand 
compensation in the form of an interest rate, to defer spending the dollar. Similarly, a 
cost of one dollar incurred now is not the same in value as a cost of one dollar to be 
incurred in twelve months time, and the implication is that people would be willing to 
pay to defer this outlay. The compensation required for postponing the receipt of 
income, or willingness to pay to delay a cost reflects the individual’s discount rate. In 
the case of not on bail offenders confronted with a plea decision, the choice is 10 
 
between the cost of a certain and an uncertain jail sentence. The cost of each 
alternative is driven by foregone income while in custody, the sentence imposed by 
the court, court delay and the prisoner’s discount rate. The final decision reflects the 
prisoner’s discount rate, because due to court delay, defined as the time elapsing 
between the initial remand and final determination of the matter by the court, the costs 
and expected costs of the respective pleas are incurred at different points in time. This 
revealed discount rate denoted as r* is the value of r, at which the cost of a guilty plea 
will be exactly equal to the expected cost of a trial.
1
Static present value calculations however, should only be used in analysing once off 
decisions, where there is no scope for waiting or for changing one’s mind. In the 
context of this problem, this means that the plea decision has to be made by the 
prisoner immediately on being remanded in custody by the court after bail is refused, 
or never. Clearly, this scenario does not apply to the prisoner’s plea decision, and it 
would be a foolish strategy to plead so early on in the proceedings. In fact criminal 
court proceedings are plagued by adjournments on the part of defendants and 
prosecutors and plea switches by offenders are quite common, i.e. much delay is 
endogenous as opposed to exogenous.
  
2
                                                           
1 It follows from the nature of the PV calculation for a stream of costs incurred at different points in 
time that there is a strict negative relationship between different values of r the discount rate, and the 
PV of the costs of a guilty plea and a trial. The value of r* is the discount rate that equates both costs. 
For more detail see Torre (2007-08).  
  Weatherburn and Baker (2000) in their 
detailed analysis of NSW District Court data found that cases failing to proceed to 
2  Exogenous delay refers to insufficient judges and or court capacity to cope with the volume of 
hearings or to use the words of Payne (2007) diminished court or criminal justice resources. 11 
 
trial on the days that they are listed were driven by three factors: (a) the accused 
changed their plea to guilty (35%), (b) an adjournment was granted to the defendant 
or the prosecutor (29%) or (c) the matter was not reached because the court had over 
listed matters (22%). Payne (2007) notes that these results are similar to those in other 
Australian jurisdictions; for example, “ The number of trials that are finalised by late 
guilty pleas or withdrawal on or near to the trial date…ranges between 33 and 59%. 
The national average was 39%.” 
This should not really come as any surprise, when the nature of the plea ‘game’ is 
considered. It is a contest between the prosecutor and the defendant, where court 
delay can be and is used strategically.
 3
                                                           
3 In the case of the prosecutor, the analogue of the defendant’s plea switch is deciding down the track to 
offer a sentence discount in order to encourage a guilty plea. 
 The source of potential strategic gains is that 
the prosecutor (offender) wants to maximise (minimise) the probability of a 
conviction (P), consequently, their respective objectives conflict with each other. 
Furthermore, court delay (T) provides scope for each party to achieve their goals, 
because P fluctuates over time randomly, rather than predictably or deterministically. 
Randomness is important in a criminal dispute because it gives the contestants 
flexibility, in the sense of constantly allowing them to evaluate their optimal courses 
of action, as information, which impacts on P, arrives sporadically and needs to be 
constantly assessed for its probative value. Static PV computations are not appropriate 12 
 
to model these sorts of dynamics; rather, what is required is a dynamic version of the 
PV approach.
4
In this paper, this deficiency is remedied and another set of estimates is derived, using 




5 It is  assumed that defendants are risk neutral and legally aided.
6
 
 The former 
assumption  is commonly used in analysing the economics of criminal sanctions 
(Polinsky, 2004 & 2007; Polinsky & Shavell, 1999A & 1999B), and generates 
midpoint estimates of the parameter being measured in this study. Introducing risk 
aversion and risk taking would necessitate obtaining largely unobservable data on 
offenders’ risk premiums; consequently this exercise is not attempted. The legally 
aided assumption simplifies the notation employed in the formal model. In order to 
assist the reader, the methodology underpinning the table 1 results is described as 
intuitively as possible. Then it is explained how this needs to be modified to capture 
the dynamics of the probability of conviction during the delay period. 
11. Methodology
7
                                                           
4 Shockley (2007) discusses extensively the uses of the static and dynamic PV models to a diverse 
range of topics in finance including the valuation of real options. 
 
5  In any case, given the methodology employed in this study, there is insufficient data to derive 
meaningful estimates of discount rates for offenders who are on bail. 
6 Risk neutral means that an offender is indifferent between uncertain punishment (trial) and certain 
punishment (guilty plea), which yields equivalent disutility. In other words, risk is neither a cost nor a 
benefit to the offender. This means that the offender would not be willing to pay to avoid the risk of a 
trial or willing to pay to take on the risk of a trial. 
7 A more formal version of this model has been placed in the appendix. 13 
 
 
The starting point is to specify how the offender’s plea decision responds to changes 
in the certain (uncertain) prison sentence following a guilty (not guilty) plea, on the 
reasonable assumption that the lower cost alternative will be chosen. Cost 
encompasses both foregone income during incarceration as well as psychic disutility 
from loss of personal liberty. However, only the former can be measured, so that the 
discount rate estimates are to be interpreted in terms of economic costs only.  
 
Expression (1) is the economic cost of a guilty plea to the defendant. 
 
            Gp = (Y, D, r, t)       (1) 
 
where, Gp is a guilty plea, Y is the offender’s foregone legal or illegal income while 
on remand waiting for the court hearing until sentence, and then, during the duration 
of the sentence D, r is the offender’s  unobserved  discount rate and t is the time 
elapsing from the time of remand until sentence.                     
                           
 
If the not on bail defendant chooses to plead not guilty, then the expected cost of a 
trial is equal to:  
          E(C) = (Y, P, D, r, T)  (2) 
In (2) P is the probability of being convicted following a trial, and T is the time 
elapsing from the time of remand until the conclusion of the trial. Sentence length is 
in terms of units of time, so that one unit of prison sentence is equal to one dollar’s 14 
 
worth of disutility to an individual. In both (1) and (2) since Gp and E(C) are both 
related to r the discount rate, these relationships can be shown graphically holding all 
of the other variables constant. In both cases, the relationship between Gp, E(C) and r 
will be a continuously downward sloping curve, where r is placed on the horizontal 
and Gp and E(C) on the vertical axes respectively, i.e. as the offender’s discount rate 
increases the present value (PV) of an amount of foregone income for a fixed period 
of time (economic cost of imprisonment) will decline.
8
 
  These relationships are 











                                                           
8 An intuitive explanation of present value and discount rates is given in Torre (2007-08). Briefly, 
people are assumed to have positive discount rates, where the discount rate measures the compensation 
someone would require to delay receiving a certain sum of income for a fixed time period, or what 
someone would be willing to pay to delay incurring a cost for a fixed period of time. 




   Figure 1 
Gp, E(C) 15 
 
 
Since the discount rate r appears in (1) and (2), (1) can be set equal to (2) and then 
solved for a value of r. This r, which will be denoted as r* in figure 2 will be the best 
estimate of the prisoner’s discount rate, i.e. the compensation required per dollar of 













At r*, in figure 2 the two sentence costs are equal so that the offender is indifferent 
between a certain or an expected prison sentence. 
                                                           
9 This will be explained in more detail subsequently. It should also be noted at this point that when the 
exercise of ‘finding’ r* is undertaken, there are two possibilities in relation to the positioning of the 
curves relative to each other. Either E(C) is < Gp to the left of r* and conversely to the right of r*, (as 
in figure 2) or, E(C) > Gp o the left of r* and conversely to the right of r*. 
r 
  PV 




         Figure 2 
r1 16 
 
Expressions (1) and (2) measure the static PV of the cost of a certain (uncertain) 
prison sentence, since any decision made by comparing one with the other, cannot be 
changed.  For example, if the offender’s value of r is r1 in figure 2, then the 
implication is that the trial or uncertain prison sentence will be the final choice, since 
at r1, E(C) < Gp. If this is the observed actual choice, then the prisoner’s discount rate 
must have been ≤ r*. However, to reiterate this static PV criterion is unsatisfactory as 
a description of the plea process, since it does not capture the learning and responding 
opportunities, which the passing of time presents to the offender and the prosecutor, in 
the context of the plea decision. These arise because P, the prisoner’s probability of 
conviction after a trial, fluctuates during the period from remand until sentence. In 
order to convert (2) into a more dynamic expression (dynamic PV), P needs to be 
converted into a random variable by writing it as a function of T, i.e.  (T) P
≈
, so that (2) 
now becomes 
E(C) = (Y,  (T) P
≈
, D, r, T)                                                                                              (3)   
The easiest way to randomise P is to assume that it conforms to a uniform probability 
distribution with randomness increasing over time
10
How does expression (3), dynamic PV (DPV), change the visual interpretation of 
figure 2? This time, instead of one r*, there will be a distribution of values of r*, 
.  Expression (3) is the dynamic 
version of the PV criterion. 
                                                           
10 With a uniform probability distribution all values of the random variable P are equally likely to occur 
during the delay period. This probability distribution is commonly used to model the behaviour of a 
stochastic or random variable. 17 
 
which is generated by random shifts of the uncertain economic cost of prison (E(C)) 
curve as T and P simultaneously change over time.
11
 
 A sketch of this process is shown 
in figure 3 using three different values of T and P, which yields three different 














The empirical challenge is to identify the distribution of r* values in figure 3 for 
different offences. When formulating the plea decision, each offender will confront ex 
                                                           
11 There are two effects working here, changes in T changing the value of P, which in turn shift the 
expected prison cost curve up or down. As time passes E(C) will shift upwards for a given value of P, 
and conversely for decreases in delay. Increases in P  as delay increases  due to information 
unfavourable to the prisoner but favourable to the prosecutor becoming available, shift the E(C) 
upwards, and conversely, favourable (unfavourable) information becoming available to the prisoner 
(prosecutor), shift it downwards.  With P and T changing simultaneously, two effects pull in the 
opposite direction, so that the impact of r* depends upon which is the stronger. 




           Figure  3 
EC (T1, P1) 
EC(T2, P2) 
EC(T3,P3) 
r*3  r*2  r*1 18 
 
ante a large number of plausible combinations of each of the parameter values in (1) 
and (3), Y, t, T, D. In the case of α, two values suffice a low, and a high initial 
probability of conviction, when the offender is charged and remanded. Importantly, 
defendant income levels Y do not need to be observed, since dividing (1) and (3) 
through by Y eliminates this variable. In figure 3, r* does not depend on Y. It only 




. Entire distributions for three different offences, which were finalised in the 
New South Wales (NSW) higher courts in 2004, murder, aggravated robbery and 
burglary, are identified.                   
For the purposes of the simulations, a representative random sample utilising all of the 
actual values of the  observable parameters underpinning the model needs  to be 
generated. The parameters are  actual waiting times and sentence lengths, 
(imprisonment) for a guilty plea and trial respectively.  Rather than relying on the 
highly aggregated data provided by the Bureau in its published court statistics, all of 
the information available for each person charged was obtained for 2004. Table 2 
provides summary statistics for actual waiting time from remand in custody until 
sentence is passed by the court defined in years, and sentence length (imprisonment in 
years), obtained from the Bureau (2004) for all persons charged, who were legally 
aided and not granted bail for the three indicated offences.  
 
                                                           
12 Depends on is not used in the causative sense. Causation between these variables and the value of r* 
cannot be inferred from the methodology, which has been employed. 19 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics for actual waiting time and sentence length. 
 
 
                      Aggravated                       Murder                          Burglary 
                       Robbery 
             
                     NG*           G                     NG          G                    NG          G 
                                                                            
                                                          
 
 
Min               0.23         0.18                   0.60        0.76                  0.035        0.10                                                                     
                     0.33          0.41                   1.41       1.50                   0.08         0.17 
 
Q1                0.53          0.73                   1.60       1.23                    0.46       0.65 
                     1.50          1.56                   12.75      8.75                   1.00       1.00 
 
Median         0.77          0.91                     1.86      1.44                  0.611       0.84 
                     2.0             2.50                   14.25     12.62                1.50         1.50 
 
Mean            1.04          1.16                    2.12        2.06                  0.72       0.96 
                     2.60          2.71                   14.22       12.32                1.75       1.82 
 
Q3                1.10          1.44                    2.28       1.86                   0.82       1.21 
                     3.50          3.50                    15.38     16.38                 2.00       2.50 
 
Max              18.86        4.89                    9.50       6.82                   3.88       3.48 
                     7.75          7.50                     23         25                         10       12 
 
N**              202            113                     69          15                        282       163 
 
 
NG* = NG is a not guilty plea and G is a guilty plea. The first row for each of the 
summary measures is waiting time in years (t or T) and the second row is sentence 








From the distribution of actual values in Table 2, a random sample of 19, 15 and 30 
values of waiting time and sentence length in months for the offences of aggravated 
robbery, murder and burglary respectively was taken. The defendant’s probability of 
conviction on being charged α is unobservable. Two initial values low (0.3) and high 
(0.8) are arbitrarily chosen.  Defendants prosecuted for aggravated robbery therefore 
faced 19^2 and 19^3 possible combinations of values of D and t for a guilty plea and 
D, T and α for a not guilty plea disposition respectively. In the case of murder the 
maximum number of feasible combinations was 15^2 and 15^3 for the guilty and not 
guilty plea respectively, and for burglary 30^2 and 30^3 for the respective pleas. 
 
For each combination of values of the variables, appropriate software was used to 
search for an intersection point between the cost of a guilty plea and expected cost of 
a trial. These values of r* generate a distribution from which it is possible to infer 
values of individual defendant’s actual discount rates. Given the distribution of the 
underlying data from which the samples were taken, and since the r* estimates are on 
a continuous scale, the median is the most likely estimate of the true r* for each 
offence. Consequently, the median values for the three offences were compared to see 
if they were different from one another using Mood’s Median Test, a non parametric 
test, which is a more robust alternative to the Kruskal-Wallis test in the presence of 
outliers in the data (Hollander & Wolfe, 1973). The results for all three offences were 21 
 
found to be significantly different  (p  =  0.05)  for  both  α  values.  The  results are 
presented in Tables 3 to 5 below. 
 
Table 3: Results for Aggravated Robbery 
  α= 0.3    α = 0.8 
Measures  GP < NG    NG  < GP 
  r*    r* 
Min  0.02    0.02 
Q1  0.24    0.15 
Median  0.47    0.336 
Mean  0.56    0.380 
Q3  0.802    0.546 
Max  2.006    1.269 
95% CI  (0.035, 1.4949)    (0.020, 0.9381) 
N**  124,650    47,340 
N ** Number of intersection points or values of r* found.22 
 
 
Table 4: Results for Murder 
  α = 0.3    α = 0.8 
Measures  GP < NG    NG  < GP 
  r*    r* 
Min  0.02    0.02 
Q1  0.21    0.08 
Median  0.29    0.125 
Mean  0.29    0.135 
Q3  0.35    0.185 
Max  0.77    0.366 
95% CI  (0.025, 0.975)    (0.025, 0.975) 
N**  24,330    32,400 
N ** Number of intersection points or values of r* found.23 
 
 
Table 5: Results for Burglary 
  α= 0.3    α = 0.8 
Measures  GP < NG    NG  < GP 
  r*    r* 
Min  0.02    0.02 
Q1  0.29    0.15 
Median  0.53    0.26 
Mean  0.61    0.32 
Q3  0.81    0.47 
Max  2.95    1.19 
95% CI  (0.025, 0.975)    (0.025, 0.975) 
N**  138,270    52,650 
N ** Number of intersection points or values of r* found.24 
 
 
In order to facilitate their interpretation, the quantitative estimates in tables 3 to 5 are 
summarised diagrammatically below in figures 4 to 6, where r* is the median value of the 
relevant distribution. 
 
Aggravated Robbery (median estimate):                                                






































Murder (median estimate): 
 









































Burglary (median estimate): 
 





































As discussed earlier, Listokin has raised four important questions, which require an answer, 
in relation to discounting by criminals. In this study, some evidence has been presented in 
relation to the first and fourth questions, i.e. do criminals discount the future and are their 
discount rates exceptionally high? Both must be answered in the affirmative. 
Table 6:  
                                                      
α*                                                    0.3                                     0.8 
Murder                                           0.29                                    0.12 
A/Robbery                                     0.47                                    0.33 
Burglary                                         0.53                                    0.26    
α* is the initial conviction probability for a low and high probability prisoner respectively. 
Table 6 derived from figures 4 to 6 partitions the distribution of prisoners prosecuted for the 
three indicated offences into those who went to trial and those who pleaded guilty according 
to their discount rates. Two categories of offender are identified: those who had an initial low 
(high) probability of conviction. The partitioning instrument r* is the discount rate most 
likely to make the prisoner indifferent between certain and uncertain punishment. 
 
Those initially, low probability of conviction prisoners who pleaded guilty to murder (15) had 
a discount rate of ≥ 0.29, while those who went to trial (69) had a discount rate ≤ 0.29. Those 
who pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery (113) had a discount rate of  ≥ 0.47, while those 
who went to trial (202) had a discount rate  ≤ 0.47. Finally, tho se who pleaded guilty to 28 
 
burglary (163) had a discount rate of  ≥ 0.53,  while those who went to trial (282) had a 
discount rate ≤ 0.53. 
 
The distribution is reversed for those prisoners, who initially had a high probability of 
conviction (0.8), i.e. r* is a lower bound estimate of those who went to trial and an upper 
bound estimate of those who pleaded guilty. Those who pleaded guilty to murder (15) had a 
discount rate ≤ 0.12, while those who pleaded not guilty (69) had a discount rate ≥ 0.12. In 
the case of aggravated robbery those who pleaded guilty (113) had a discount rate  ≤ 0.33 and 
those who went to trial (202) ≥ 0.33. For the offence of burglary, those prisoners who pleaded 
guilty (163) had a discount rate of ≤ 0.26 and those who pleaded not guilty (282) ≥ 0.26. 
 
The estimates in table 6 are more reliable than those in table 2 for the reasons explained in the 
text, yet each set of estimates do not diverge markedly. Four conclusions based on the second 
set of estimates in table 6 can be drawn from the analysis. First, prisoners who pleaded guilty 
had different discount rates from those who went to trial. Second, prisoners who were 
charged with murder had lower discount rates on average. Third, the great majority of 
prisoners do exhibit high discount rates, which is consistent with the Nagin and Paternoster 
and Listokin hypothesis. Fourth, only a very small proportion (15 out of 844 or 1.7%) who 
pleaded guilty to murder exhibit relatively low discount rates, i.e.  ≤ 0.12. The scope for 









Expression (1) is the economic cost of a guilty plea to the defendant. 
 
            Gp = (Y, D, r, t) 
The static PV of (1) is given by (2)       (1) 
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If the not on bail defendant chooses to plead not guilty, then the expected cost of a trial is 
equal to:  
 
          E(C) = (Y, P, D, r, T)  (3) 
The static present value of (3) is given by: 
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In order to convert (2) and (4) into dynamic PV expressions, it is assumed that P, which 
fluctuates from the prisoner’s remand until sentence, is distributed over time as a uniform 
probability distribution. 











                                                                                                             (5) 
In (5) α is the prisone r’s initial probability of conviction at the time of being charged. As T 
increases, the range over which randomness can fluctuate also increases. For example, if α = 
0.4 initially and T = 0, then substitution into (3) yields the lower value of the distribution 0.4 
and the upper value of 0.4 also. If T increases to 1, the lower value falls to 0.2 and the higher 
value increases to 0.7. 









































                                                                                                               (6) 
Substituting E(P) in (6) into (4) yields: 
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Equation (7) is the dynamic version (DPV) of the PV criterion. 
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